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Abstract. This paper examines the impact of month of birth on national
achievement test scores in England whilst children are in school, and on
subsequent further and higher education participation. Using geographical
variation in school admissions policies, we are able to split this difference into
an age of starting school or length of schooling effect, and an age of sitting
the test effect. We find that the month in which you are born matters for test
scores at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16, with younger children performing significantly
worse, on average, than their older peers. Furthermore, almost all of this
difference is due to the fact that younger children sit exams up to one year
earlier than older cohort members. The difference in test scores at age 16
potentially affects the number of pupils who stay on beyond compulsory
schooling, with predictable labour market consequences. Indeed, we find
that the impact of month of birth persists into higher education (college)
decisions, with age 19/20 participation declining monotonically with month
of birth. The fact that being young in your school year affects outcomes after
the completion of compulsory schooling points to the need for urgent policy
reform, to ensure that future cohorts of children are not adversely affected
by the month of birth lottery inherent in the English education system.
JEL classification: I21,I28.
∗Institute for Fiscal Studies, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE. E-mail:
(claire c@ifs.org.uk)
†Department of Quantitative Social Science, Institute of Education, University of London.
20 Bedford Way, WC1H 0AL.E-mail: (lorraine d@ifs.org.uk)
‡University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT; Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE. E-Mail: (c.meghir@ucl.ac.uk)
§Acknowledgements. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the Esme Fair-
bairn Foundation (grant number ED/04-2226) and the Department for Children, Schools
and Families (DCSF) via the Centre for the Economics of Education. The authors would
like to thank Ciaran Hayes of DCSF, Hilary Hodgson of Esme Fairbairn and seminar par-
ticipants at the Oxford University Department of Education (May 2005), the Institute
for Fiscal Studies (June 2005), the Institute of Education (October 2005), Lancaster Uni-
versity Economics Department (February 2006), the Royal Economic Society Conference
(April 2007), the Australian Conference for Economists (September 2007), the ESRC
National Research Methods Festival (July 2008) and the Society of Labor Economists
Conference (May 2009) for useful comments and advice. They would also like to thank
Saul Blumberg, Grace Crawford, Rose Crawford, Mariam Ghorbannejad, Everton Loun-
des, Rhiannon Markless, Stella Tang and Joan Wickham for their assistance with the
data collection.
  
1. Introduction 
Any school admissions policy involves having children in the same class or school 
year who are different ages. Does this difference in age have long term implications?  
And what should be the policy response if it does? In England, the month in which 
you are born affects the age at which you start school, the length of schooling you 
receive and the age at which you sit key tests. This paper addresses the long term 
consequences for education outcomes of being born in a particular month. In 
England, we find that being younger in your school year has significant negative 
effects on outcomes including national achievement tests at age 16 and higher 
education (college) participation at age 19/20. This negative effect is not only for the 
very youngest – it is incremental across the whole age distribution within a cohort.  
Our results show that the effects of being younger in the school year are substantial, 
even at later ages, but also that the effect of these differences could be remedied 
relatively straightforwardly and in a cost-effective way. 
Of course, we are not the first paper to tackle this issue: it has been documented 
across many countries that children born at the end of the academic year (which runs 
from 1 September to 31 August in England) perform more poorly, on average, than 
older members of their cohort.1 A number of factors may contribute to this: first, in a 
system in which exams are taken at a fixed date, some children will sit them up to a 
year younger than others (“absolute age” or “age of sitting the test” effect); these 
children may also suffer from the fact that they were “too young” when they started 
school (“age of starting school” effect). Moreover, the younger children may be 
adversely affected by the fact that they are younger than their peers (“relative age” 
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 See, for example, Alton & Massey (1998), Massey, Elliott & Ross (1996), Russell & Startup (1986), Sharp (1995), 
Sharp & Hutchison (1997) and Thomas (1995) for England, Elder & Lubotsky (2007) for the US, Smith (2007) for 
Canada, Puhani & Weber (2005) for Germany, Borg & Falzon (1995) for Malta, McEwan & Shapiro (2006) for Chile 
and Bedard & Dhuey (2006) for an international study. 
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effect). Finally, depending on the admissions system, some of the younger children 
may have attended school for fewer terms prior to the exam (“length of schooling” 
effect). However, there is relatively little reliable evidence on how each of these 
factors contributes to the performance shortfall of younger children in a cohort, 
particularly for longer-term academic outcomes.   
Two recent papers have looked at this issue.2 Fredriksson and Ockert (2005) use 
Swedish administrative data for the population born 1935–84 to look at the impact of 
school starting age on education and labour market outcomes. They find that 
increasing school starting age by one year increases grade point average at the age 
of 16 by 0.2 standard deviations. They exploit within-school variation in the age 
composition across cohorts to separate the impact of relative age (the age position 
effect) from the impact of absolute age (plus the effect of school entrance age) and 
find that relative age accounts for only 6 per cent of the difference in test scores at 
that age. However, they can only separate the effect of age at entry to school from 
absolute age by looking at outcomes after the end of compulsory schooling (when 
there is independent variation between the two). They find that starting school later 
has a small positive impact on earnings (although they point out that the net earnings 
effect over the life cycle is negative, because starting school later implies entering the 
labour market later as well).3 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) identify the impact of school starting age on IQ 
scores, educational attainment, teenage pregnancy and earnings using Norwegian 
administrative data. They find that starting school younger has a significant positive 
effect on IQ scores at age 18 and the probability of becoming a teenage mother, but 
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 Bell & Daniels (1990), Fogelman & Gorbach (1978) and Sharp, Hutchison & Whetton (1994) for England and 
Cascio & Whitmore Schanzenbach (2007) and Datar (2006) for the US are some other attempts. 
3
 It should be noted that there is never any variation in length of schooling in this paper. 
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little effect on educational attainment. In contrast to Fredriksson and Ockert (2005), 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) find that starting school younger has a small 
positive effect on earnings, which has disappeared by age 30. This pattern is 
consistent with the idea that starting school later reduces potential labour market 
experience at a particular age (for a given level of education), but that the importance 
of this year of experience is reduced as individuals age. 
Our paper adds to the existing literature by exploiting a key feature of the English 
education system: that school admissions policies are determined by local, rather 
than central, education authorities.4 This gives rise to considerable regional variation 
in the age at which children born on a particular day of the year start school.5 As we 
are able to observe exact date of birth, this enables us to separately identify the 
causal impacts of age of sitting the test, and age of starting school (or length of 
schooling, not both6) for both compulsory and post-compulsory schooling outcomes – 
something that, to our knowledge, no other papers have been able to do. 
The rest of this paper now proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline our 
modelling approaches. Section 3 provides more information about the data-sets that 
we use and Section 4 describes our sample. In Section 5, we document the month of 
birth penalty for test scores measured at ages 7, 11 and 14. Section 6 exploits 
geographical variation in admissions policies to show that the majority of the 
difference in attainment arises because children are younger when they sit the tests, 
rather than because they receive fewer terms of schooling prior to sitting these tests. 
In Section 7, we examine the persistence of month of birth penalties, by showing test 
                                                     
 
 
4
 There are around 150 Local Authorities (LAs) – which are responsible for setting admissions policies – in England. 
5
 There is also some variation over time within authorities. 
6
 Note that there is insufficient variation in the admissions policies implemented in England for us to be able to 
separate the effect of age of starting school and the effect of length of schooling. 
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score differentials at ages 11, 14, 16 and 18, as well as higher education (college) 
participation decisions at age 19/20. Finally, Section 8 concludes, and considers how 
policy could be used to address the disadvantage faced by children who are younger 
in their year.  
2. Modelling approach 
To estimate the impact of month of birth on education outcomes, we adopt a 
regression discontinuity approach, running regressions of the following form: 
11 4
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(1) 
where Mikt = 1 if individual i is born in month k (the oldest children in the year – those 
born in September – are our omitted category), s  is a school fixed effect, λt is a set 
of cohort dummies and rtP  is a set of admissions policy dummies representing the 
four policies (r=1,2,3 and 4)  we observe in the data at time t (described in detail in 
Section 3).7 This model allows us to identify the impact of being born in a particular 
month, including the effects of the discontinuity on children born up to one month 
either side of the academic year cut-off, or indeed any month-on-month comparison 
as we have multiple cohorts. 
In this model, we are making comparisons within schools (and therefore within 
admissions policy areas8), so as long as the observed and unobserved 
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 This is necessary because in a small number of local authorities, admission policies change across the different 
cohorts we consider, and these changes are not accounted for by the inclusion of school fixed effects. Note that our 
results are not materially different if we use school-cohort fixed effects instead. 
8
 Note that local authorities (LAs) are not responsible for the admissions policies of all state schools in their areas; 
some are free to choose their own admissions policies. Between 2001-02 and 2006-07, LAs were responsible for 
admissions policies covering approximately two thirds of the state school population. Our analysis assumes that all 
schools follow the admissions policy set by their LA, such that we estimate something more akin to an intention-to-
treat effect. The question we are asking is „What is the impact on education outcomes of starting school in an LA that 
follows one admissions policy rather than any other?‟. This should, theoretically, weaken the treatment effect, so our 
estimates are likely to provide a lower bound to the true impact of date of birth on education outcomes. 
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characteristics of students at the school (and the effectiveness of the school) do not 
vary by date of birth, we will estimate the causal impact of being born in a particular 
month (relative to September).9 However, we include a variety of observed individual 
and local area characteristics (X’it) (see Section 3.2 for details) to improve the 
precision of our estimates. 
If we are able to ascertain that there is a significant difference between the education 
outcomes of children born in different months, then gaining a fuller understanding of 
the underlying causes of these differences becomes very important. In most 
countries, it is extremely difficult to separate the impacts of absolute age (age at 
which the child sits the test), age of starting school and length of schooling on 
compulsory schooling outcomes, because there is an exact linear relationship 
between the three: 
Age at test = Age of starting school + Length of schooling 
If all children in a particular cohort start school at the same time and sit tests at the 
same time, then it is impossible to identify these three effects separately on 
compulsory schooling outcomes.10  
However, whilst it is the case that children in England all sit tests at the same time, 
there is geographical variation in the age at which children start school (and hence 
the number of terms of schooling they receive prior to the tests). If we assume that 
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 We can check the validity of part of this assumption by testing whether the probability of being a k=1 born child 
compared with the probability of being a k=12 born child varies by observed characteristics. This could happen if 
parents from certain backgrounds try to ensure that their child will always be one of the oldest in the school year 
through conception decisions, or if children from certain backgrounds who are amongst the youngest in their year are 
more likely to be put into private schools (our data is for state school children only). Initial analysis of our sample 
suggests that there is some evidence that children who are eligible for free school meals (a proxy for low family 
income) are around 2.7 percentage points more likely to be born in August than children who are not eligible for free 
school meals. (Buckles & Hungerman (2008) find similar results for the US.) Hence, we always control for observed 
background characteristics (although in practice this does not make any difference to our results). Results without 
controlling for observable characteristics are available from the authors on request. 
10
 In addition, the oldest children (in absolute terms) in each cohort will also be the oldest relative to others in their 
class, so the age position effect may also play a role.  
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unobserved geographical variables are not correlated with test scores, then we can 
separately identify the effects of age of sitting the test and age of starting school (or 
length of schooling) on education outcomes. (We must also assume that exposure to 
a particular policy is independent of outcome, which is just the standard conditional 
independence assumption.) 
To separately identify these effects, we modify equation (1) by interacting our month 
of birth dummies,
ikM , with our policy dummies, rP . Our new estimating equation is 
given by: 
12 4
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            (2)  
where rtP , t  and s  are again admissions policy dummies, cohort dummies and 
school fixed effects respectively, and our omitted category is those born in 
September in policy area 1 (k=1, r=1). Given that we are comparing children across 
admissions policy areas (and hence across schools) to identify these effects, it 
becomes very important to control for all observed characteristics,
itX , that might 
affect school choice and academic outcomes (see Section 3.2 for details of the 
characteristics for which we are able to control).   
As mentioned earlier, there is also some variation in admissions policies over time 
within authority. This allows us to use difference in differences methods to identify the 
impact of changing policies (and hence starting school earlier) amongst children in 
those local authorities. We use this as a robustness check on our main results.  
3. Data 
We use administrative data comprising a census of all children attending state 
(public) schools in England, which includes national achievement (Key Stage) test 
results at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16, plus limited background characteristics (including 
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date of birth, home postcode and a school identifier). We also have access to data on 
post-compulsory schooling outcomes, including academic and vocational 
qualifications achieved by age 18, and higher education (college) participation 
decisions at ages 19 and 20 (the first two years of potential participation).  
3.1 Test score outcomes: the Key Stage tests 
The Key Stage tests are national achievement tests sat by all children in state 
schools in England: Key Stage 1 is taken at age 7, Key Stage 2 at age 11, Key Stage 
3 at age 14 and Key Stage 4 (GCSEs) at age 16. Key Stage 5 covers post-
compulsory education (from age 16 to age 18). We have access to results for Key 
Stage 1 from 1997-98 to 2006-07, for Key Stage 2 from 1994–95 to 2006–07, for Key 
Stage 3 from 1996–97 to 2006–07, for Key Stage 4 from 2001–02 to 2006–07 and for 
Key Stage 5 from 2000-01 to 2006-07. As we are not able to follow a single cohort of 
children throughout compulsory and post-compulsory schooling using the available 
data, we instead make use of two separate cohorts to piece together a complete 
picture. We discuss the construction of these cohorts in Section 4. 
At ages 7, 11 and 14, the main subjects assessed are English, maths and science. In 
each case, pupils are allocated an attainment level, which can be translated into a 
corresponding points score (using a specified formula) ranging from 3 to 21 at Key 
Stage 1 (with 15 being the expected level), 15 to 33 at Key Stage 2 (with 27 being 
the expected level) and from 17 to 45 at Key Stage 3 (with 33 being the expected 
level).11 We standardise the average of these three scores within academic year to 
create our main measure of attainment. We also calculate whether a pupil achieved 
the government‟s expected (target) level on the basis of their assigned score. 
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 Note that for Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 3 results, we also have access to raw test marks, which allows us to 
calculate a much more detailed average point score than that described above. We used these raw test scores to 
check the difference it makes using continuous scores. Using discrete rather than continuous measures of 
educational attainment makes virtually no difference to our results.  
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At age 16 (Key Stage 4), students tend to sit exams in up to 10 subjects (including 
English, maths and science). We make use of the students‟ capped average point 
score12 (that is, the score averaged across their eight best exam results) 
(standardised within academic year), plus a variable indicating whether the pupil 
achieved at least five A*–C grades (the government‟s expected level).  
At age 18 (Key Stage 5), students can choose between a wide range of academic 
and vocational qualifications. We make use of a variable indicating whether the pupil 
achieved a Level 3 qualification (the expected level) via an academic route – 
equivalent to (for example) two A-levels at grades A-E. 
3.2 Background characteristics 
Our data contains a limited set of individual characteristics, including date of birth, 
eligibility for free school meals (which can be thought of as a proxy for very low family 
income13), ethnicity, whether English is the students‟ first language, plus whether 
they have special educational needs. It also includes a school identifier.  
In some of our models, it is important to control for observable characteristics that are 
likely to affect school (and therefore admissions policy) choice and educational 
attainment. To compensate partially for the lack of family background characteristics 
available in our data, we use the pupil‟s home postcode to map in detailed 
neighbourhood characteristics to control for any local area influences on academic 
outcomes. These are included alongside the available individual-level data to 
generate the following list of controls: 
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 8 points are awarded for a grade A*, 7 for an A, 6 for a B, 5 for a C, 4 for a D, 3 for an E, 2 for an F and 1 for a G. 
13
 Pupils are entitled to free school meals if their parents receive various means-tested benefits or tax credits and 
have a gross household income of less than £15,575 (in 2008–09 prices). They are eligible for free school meals if 
they are both entitled and registered as such with their local authority. 
12 
 
 ethnicity; 
 whether English is the child‟s first language; 
 whether the child is eligible for free school meals; 
 quintiles of the Index of Multiple Deprivation
14
, plus quintiles of the domains 
comprising income, employment, and education, skills and training; 
 quintiles of the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index15; 
 age distribution of the Output Area (OA)16 in which the child lives; 
 proportion of lone parents (OA level); 
 proportion of working-age population in employment (OA level); 
 average social class (OA level); 
 highest educational qualification of local population (OA level). 
3.3 Admissions policy information 
Children in England must have started school by the beginning of the term after they 
turn five: this is considerably earlier than in many other countries. As admissions 
policies are set by local (rather than central) authorities in England, however, there is 
considerable geographical variation in the age at which children start school. We 
exploit this variation to separately identify the impacts of age of sitting the test and 
age of starting school (or length of schooling) on academic outcomes.  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the main admissions policies that are in operation 
in England, together with the proportions of pupils who attend schools in areas 
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 This is a local measure of deprivation, available at Super Output Area (SOA) level (comprising approximately 1,500 
households), that makes use of seven different domains: income; employment; health and disability; education, skills 
and training; barriers to housing and services; living environment; and crime. 
15
 An additional element of the Index of Multiple Deprivation reflecting the proportion of children living in families in 
receipt of various means-tested benefits or tax credits. 
16
 Output Areas contain approximately 150 households. 
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affected by these policies in our sample.17 Table 3.2 translates these admissions 
policies into details of school entry date by month of birth. 
It should be noted that we only observe the local authority in which students sat Key 
Stage 1 (age 7) for our younger cohort – and the local authority in which students sat 
Key Stage 2 (age 11) for our older cohort – not the local authority in which they 
actually started school.18 This means that if the child has switched authorities since 
they started school (from one with a different admissions policy in place in the year in 
which they started), then the information (on age of starting school and length of 
schooling) that we assign to the child may be inaccurate.  We have checked the 
importance of this potential measurement error by analysing the difference between 
estimates obtained by assigning admissions policy according to local authority at age 
7 and/or 11 rather than local authority at age 5 using a younger cohort (for whom we 
observe information at all three ages). We do not find any evidence of significant 
differences as a result of mismeasurement of admissions policy information.19  
4. Our sample  
We use two cohorts of children for our analysis. Our first cohort includes individuals 
born between September 1990 and August 1993 (1,643,832 in total), who started 
school in academic years 1995-96, 1996-97 or 1997-98. For these individuals we 
observe national achievement test scores at age 7 (Key Stage 1), age 11 (Key Stage 
2) and age 14 (Key Stage 3).20 We use this cohort to explore how variation in 
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 Appendix A illustrates the accuracy of our admissions policy information (which was collected retrospectively). 
18
 See Section 4 for more details of these cohorts. 
19
 Results available from the authors on request. 
20
 We eliminate from our analysis individuals who do not start school in the expected year and/or who do not progress 
through the system in the usual manner (although this is a very minor problem in England). We also restrict attention 
to individuals who attend state (public) schools in England. 
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admissions policies affects outcomes (as we would expect to see the largest length 
of schooling and age of starting school effects at the youngest ages).   
Our second cohort comprises individuals born between September 1985 and August 
1988 (1,441,137 in total), who started school in academic years 1990-91, 1991-92 or 
1992-93. For these individuals we observe national achievement test scores at ages 
11, 14, 16 (Key Stage 4) and 18 (Key Stage 5), as well as participation in higher 
education (college) at age 19 or 20. We use this cohort to examine the long-term 
effects of month of birth on education outcomes.  
Table 4.1 summarises average outcomes for our two cohorts, while Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 preview our findings in Section 5, by illustrating how education outcomes vary by 
gender and date of birth across academic years. The difference in outcomes 
between individuals born either side of the academic year cut-off (represented by the 
vertical lines) is similar to the gap in outcomes between August- and September-born 
children that we document in Section 5.21  
These figures show that outcomes for August-born children are always lower than 
those for September-born children, but that this gap steadily decreases (in 
percentage terms) over time. It also shows that girls perform significantly better than 
boys, on average, at all ages, and that August-born boys have the worst absolute 
outcomes. 
5. Month of birth penalty during compulsory schooling  
This section documents the extent of the month of birth penalty in education 
outcomes for our younger cohort. We focus on differences in standardised average 
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 We document differences within (rather than between) cohorts in Section 5. This makes little difference to our 
findings (results across cohorts are available from the authors on request). 
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point scores and proportions of students reaching the governments‟ expected level in 
national achievement tests at ages 7, 11 and 14.  
Table 5.1 (and Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B) highlights a number of striking 
results. First, the effect of starting school (and sitting the tests) younger than your 
peers is a huge penalty on academic performance. For example, children born in 
August (at the end of academic year) score approximately half a standard deviation 
lower, and are 25 percentage points (over one third) less likely to reach the 
government‟s expected level, at age 7 than children born in September. Moreover, 
our results show that the month of birth penalty is approximately linear, such that 
even those born just one month later in October perform significantly worse than 
children born in September.  
Second, there is a pronounced decline in the effect of starting school (and sitting the 
test) young on test scores over time, implying that the younger children catch up 
throughout compulsory schooling. For example, by age 14, August borns score 
around 0.2 standard deviations lower, and are 8 percentage points (just over 10 per 
cent) less likely to reach the government‟s expected level, than September borns. 
However, the month on month penalty remains significant throughout the year. 
6.  Decomposing the month of birth effect 
In this section, we exploit variation in admissions policies by area and over time – as 
a result of which children born on the same day may start school at different ages, 
and hence receive a different amount of schooling prior to the tests – to explore the 
extent to which school starting age and/or length of schooling can explain these 
month of birth disparities.  
We start by using geographical variation in admissions policies. Table 6.1 compares 
month of birth penalties (in terms of standardised average point scores) for children 
16 
 
in our first cohort who start school in an area which follows a single, double or triple 
entry point system.  
Under each system, children born in September, October, November and December 
start school in the September of the year in which they turn five (see Table 3.2) and 
hence receive the same amount of schooling.22 As such, we would not expect to see 
any difference in the month of birth penalty for these children, and this presumption is 
borne out by the results at age 7. Moreover, this finding also provides suggestive 
evidence that the environment experienced by children of these ages in different 
areas – for example, in terms of the age composition and/or size of the class into 
which they enter school – is not sufficiently different to have any effect on their test 
scores two years later. 
Children born in January and February start school in September under the single 
and double entry point systems, and in January under the triple entry point system, 
thus if age of starting school and/or length of schooling affect test scores, then we 
would expect to see a difference in the test scores of January and February borns 
who start school under the triple entry point system compared to those who start 
under the single or double entry point system. However, Table 6 does not highlight 
any consistent differences for children born in these months by admissions policy.  
Children born in March and April start school in September under the single entry 
point system, and in January under the double and triple entry point systems, and for 
these individuals we do observe a difference in test scores by admissions policy. For 
example, April-born children who start school under a double (triple) entry point 
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 Note, however, that children in a two or three point entry system who start school in September may spend their 
first few months in school with a smaller number of children in the class. (Alternatively, they may be in a regular size 
class but with smaller age variation between classmates.) This is probably too small a difference to have any 
discernible effect on test scores. 
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system score 0.055 (0.041) standard deviations lower at age 7 than April-born 
children who start school under a single entry point system. This suggests that the 
negative effect of receiving one less term of schooling prior to the test outweighs the 
potentially positive effect of starting school older for these children. 
Children born in May, June, July and August start school in September under a 
single entry point system, in January under a double entry point system and in April 
under a triple entry point system. We continue to observe a significant difference 
between those who start school under a double vs. single entry point system, and a 
slightly larger difference between those who start school under a triple vs. single 
entry point system (as would be expected, given that these children have two extra 
terms of schooling rather than one), although the difference between those who start 
under a double vs. triple entry point system is not significant.  
To check the robustness of these results, we also focus on the small number of 
authorities in which there was a policy change over the years in which individuals in 
our first cohort started school. Both Hartlepool and Manchester (two urban authorities 
in the North of England) changed from a triple entry point system in 1995-96 to a 
double entry point system in 1996-97. This means that children born in February, 
March, May, June, July and August all received an extra term of schooling following 
this policy change. Our difference in differences results for these local authorities 
show no significant differences between triple and double point entry, consistent with 
the results in Table 6.1.23 
Moving on to compare results at age 14 (in Table 6.2), we observe no consistent 
differences by admissions policy, suggesting that the effects of receiving an 
additional term or two of schooling have only short-lived effects. This table shows 
                                                     
 
 
23
 Unfortunately we do not have any authorities swapping from triple point entry to single point entry for these cohorts.  
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that we continue to observe a significant negative relationship between test scores 
and age within year though.  
These results suggest a simple story: the key issue is the absolute age effect, which 
captures the fact that (taking length of schooling into account) there is a clear and 
strong negative effect of sitting exams younger. Thus, for an exam system (like the 
one in the England) in which there is no flexibility over the time at which exams are 
sat, there are persistent month of birth effects and each month younger the child is, 
the worse they perform on average. In the next section, we examine how far these 
effects persist, by examining test scores at ages 16 and 18, as well as higher 
education (college) participation at age 19/20. 
7. How long does the month of birth penalty persist? 
If the month of birth penalty did not persist it would not be much of an issue. 
However, this section documents that it does persist through compulsory schooling 
and beyond. Here, we consider differences by month of birth in national achievement 
tests at ages 11, 14 and 16, in the proportions of young people who reach the 
government‟s expected level at ages 16 and 18, and in the proportions that go on to 
higher education (college) at age 19/20. Table 7.1 (and Figures C.1 and C.2 in 
Appendix C) illustrates these results. 
These results highlight that age within year continues to have significant negative 
effects on education outcomes at ages 16, 18 and 19/20, suggesting permanent 
implications for a range of adult outcomes. Of particular interest are the effects on the 
tests taken at age 16 (at the end of compulsory schooling in England). These tests 
determine whether a child will continue into post-compulsory education and also 
define the first record that can potentially affect college admissions. At this point, the 
youngest children score 0.13 standard deviations lower than the oldest ones. This 
translates into a massive 5.8 percentage point higher potential drop out rate from 
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high school for the youngest children, and a 1.5 percentage point lower college 
enrolment rate. Moreover, this disadvantage is not restricted to the youngest children 
only: the effect is approximately linear, and significant from one month onwards.  
Thus starting school a year earlier than others implies underachievement when 
young as well as longer term impacts on attainment. The latter will have direct 
implications for earnings. Bur even the underachievement at younger ages may have 
effects that are not fully picked up by attainment, an issue which we are currently 
exploring. 
8. Policy implications and conclusions 
This paper has shown that there is a significant penalty associated with date of birth, 
such that the youngest children in a particular academic year perform significantly 
worse in national achievement tests than the oldest children. Furthermore, this 
penalty remains significant at age 16 – when individuals are making choices about 
whether to stay on beyond compulsory schooling – and also affects higher education 
participation decisions at age 19/20. 
Our findings could be used to argue that children should start school later, given that 
children born on 31 August do significantly worse than those born on the 1 
September, who are the same age, but start school up to one year later. But the 
consistency of the results amongst children of the same age who start school at 
different ages (in different admissions policy areas) suggests that it is not the age of 
starting school but the age of sitting the tests that drives these differences. Moreover, 
the fact that the month of birth effect is basically linear suggests that even if everyone 
were to start school a year later, the younger children in the class would still perform 
worse, on average, than the older children, simply because they are forced to sit the 
tests when they are younger. This effect is much more marked at early ages, when 
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the relative age difference is large. But these differences persist, even at ages when 
the relative age difference should no longer have an impact.  
This implies that the inflexible form of the English system – in which children are 
assessed at a fixed point in time (e.g. at the end of year 11, equivalent to US grade 
10) – can have long term and permanent detrimental effects, if only because it leads 
to a substantially greater likelihood of dropping out of high school and a lower 
probability of college attendance.  
Policy thus needs to address this issue by improving the flexibility of assessments. 
One simple way of doing this would be to age-normalise exam results so that 
students are compared to others of exactly the same age. This would ensure that 
students are assessed on their true ability, rather than on the luck of their month of 
birth draw. This is particularly important at age 16, when exam results determine who 
qualifies for post-compulsory education. If relatively young children on the margin are 
not made to drop out and are suitably supported while in school, it is clear that they 
will perform as well as their older counterparts with the same overall ability (as our 
results show that they catch up with their peers over time). An alternative way of 
implementing this policy (as far as exams leading to qualifications are concerned) is 
to have multiple examination periods and for children to sit for such exams when 
ready.24 
Finally, it may be important to understand whether the high early failure rates for the 
younger children have other effects not reflected in the test scores we measure at 
older ages. We plan to explore these issues in future research. 
                                                     
 
 
24
 See Crawford, Dearden & Meghir (2007) for further discussion of these policy implications. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1 Admissions policy information 
Admissions 
Policy 
Per cent 
Cohort 1 
Per cent 
Cohort 2 
Description 
Single entry date 43.9% 38.3% All children start school in the September of 
the academic year in which they turn five. 
Two entry dates 7.6% 6.4% Children born 1 September to 29 February 
start school in the September of the 
academic year in which they turn five; 
children born 1 March to 31 August start 
school in the January of the academic year in 
which they turn five. 
Three entry dates 16.0% 22.4% Children start school at the beginning of the 
term in which they turn five, so children born 
1 September to 31 December start school in 
September, children born 1 January to 30 
April start school in January and children 
born 1 May to 31 August start school in April. 
Other 3.0% 3.2% Other variations on the two and three entry 
point systems. 
Unknown 29.5% 29.8% Schools can choose their own admissions 
policy, or the admissions policy in place is not 
known or clear 
Notes: 
Figures may not sum exactly due to rounding. Cohort 1 comprises children starting school in 1995-96, 1996-97and 
1997-98, and Cohort 2 comprises those starting school in 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93. These figures summarise 
the percentage of children in our sample who started school in an authority in which the admissions policy indicated 
was in operation (including those who joined schools that do not necessarily have to follow the admissions policy set 
by the local authority).  
Table 3.2 Month of school entry (number of terms of schooling received in 
first year of full-time education) 
 Single entry point Two entry points Three entry points 
September September (3 terms) September (3 terms) September (3 terms) 
October September (3 terms) September (3 terms) September (3 terms) 
November September (3 terms) September (3 terms) September (3 terms) 
December September (3 terms) September (3 terms) September (3 terms) 
January September (3 terms) September (3 terms) January (2 terms) 
February September (3 terms) September (3 terms) January (2 terms) 
March September (3 terms) January (2 terms) January (2 terms) 
April September (3 terms) January (2 terms) January (2 terms) 
May September (3 terms) January (2 terms) April (1 term) 
June September (3 terms) January (2 terms) April (1 term) 
July September (3 terms) January (2 terms) April (1 term) 
August September (3 terms) January (2 terms) April (1 term) 
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Table 4.1 Summary of education outcomes by cohort 
 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 
Key Stage 1 (age 7)   
Mean average point score (standard deviation) 14.8 (3.9)  
Proportion reaching expected level 0.548  
   
Key Stage 2 (age 11)   
Mean average point score (standard deviation) 27.2 (4.4) 26.0 (4.4) 
Proportion reaching expected level 0.678 0.565 
   
Key Stage 3 (age 14)   
Mean average point score (standard deviation) 34.2 (7.0) 33.3 (6.8) 
Proportion reaching expected level 0.667 0.598 
   
Key Stage 4 (age 16)   
Mean capped average point score (standard deviation)  4.5 (1.9) 
Proportion getting 5 A*-C grades at GCSE  0.532 
   
Key Stage 5 (age 18)   
Proportion getting a Level 3 qualification (academic route)  0.360 
   
Higher education (college) participation (age 19/20)   
Proportion attending higher education  0.321 
   
Total sample 1,643,832 1,441,137 
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Table 5.1 Month of birth penalties: mean differences in key education 
outcomes at ages 7, 11 and 14  
 Standardised average point 
scores 
Proportion reaching 
government’s expected level 
 Age 7 Age 11 Age 14 Age 7 Age 11 Age 14 
September base 0.302 0.178 0.114 0.676 0.743 0.711 
October difference -0.047** -0.031** -0.020** -0.019** -0.011** -0.007** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
November -0.098** -0.061** -0.038** -0.039** -0.021** -0.015** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
December -0.156** -0.099** -0.061** -0.065** -0.035** -0.023** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
January -0.220** -0.131** -0.082** -0.092** -0.048** -0.031** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
February -0.270** -0.159** -0.099** -0.113** -0.058** -0.037** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
March -0.323** -0.186** -0.114** -0.135** -0.067** -0.043** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
April -0.376** -0.218** -0.135** -0.158** -0.081** -0.054** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
May -0.439** -0.250** -0.145** -0.184** -0.092** -0.056** 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
June -0.493** -0.283** -0.164** -0.210** -0.106** -0.065** 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
July -0.538** -0.304** -0.177** -0.229** -0.115** -0.070** 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
August -0.590** -0.336** -0.197** -0.253** -0.128** -0.079** 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Notes:  
All models include cohort dummies, admissions policies dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, 
whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language), a series of 
neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details) and school fixed effects.  
**
 
indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the local authority level. 
26 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Month of birth penalty: mean differences in standardised average 
point scores at age 7, by admissions policy  
 Standardised average point scores at age 7 
 Single 
entry 
point 
Two entry 
points 
Difference 
to single 
entry 
point 
Three 
entry 
points 
Difference 
to single 
entry 
point 
Difference 
to two 
entry 
points 
September base 0.295 0.264  0.266   
October difference -0.047** -0.054** -0.006 -0.042** 0.005 0.011 
[0.004] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.014] 
November -0.101** -0.102** -0.001 -0.089** 0.012 0.013 
 [0.005] [0.011] [0.012] [0.007] [0.009] [0.013] 
December -0.154** -0.168** -0.014 -0.154** 0.000 0.014 
 [0.005] [0.013] [0.014] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
January -0.200** -0.237** -0.037* -0.243** -0.043** -0.006 
 [0.006] [0.014] [0.015] [0.008] [0.010] [0.016] 
February -0.259** -0.275** -0.016 -0.280** -0.021 -0.005 
 [0.005] [0.016] [0.017] [0.009] [0.011] [0.018] 
March -0.307** -0.359** -0.052** -0.339** -0.032** 0.020 
 [0.005] [0.013] [0.014] [0.008] [0.010] [0.015] 
April -0.352** -0.407** -0.055** -0.394** -0.041** 0.013 
 [0.005] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.015] 
May -0.407** -0.457** -0.050** -0.486** -0.078** -0.029* 
 [0.005] [0.009] [0.011] [0.007] [0.009] [0.012] 
June -0.460** -0.522** -0.062** -0.522** -0.062** 0.000 
 [0.005] [0.016] [0.017] [0.010] [0.011] [0.018] 
July -0.504** -0.555** -0.051** -0.569** -0.065** -0.014 
 [0.006] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.015] 
August -0.557** -0.610** -0.053** -0.620** -0.063** -0.010 
 [0.005] [0.013] [0.014] [0.010] [0.012] [0.017] 
Notes:  
All models include cohort dummies, admissions policy dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, 
whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language), a series of 
neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details) and school fixed effects.  
**
 
indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the local authority level. 
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Table 6.2 Month of birth penalty: mean differences in standardised average 
point scores at age 14, by admissions policy  
 Standardised average point scores at age 14 
 Single 
entry 
point 
Two entry 
points 
Difference 
to single 
entry 
point 
Three 
entry 
points 
Difference 
to single 
entry 
point 
Difference 
to two 
entry 
points 
September base 0.705 0.692  0.702   
October difference -0.006* -0.007 -0.001 -0.011** -0.004 -0.003 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
November -0.017** -0.008 0.009 -0.011** 0.005 -0.004 
 [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
December -0.023** -0.026** -0.003 -0.024** -0.001 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] 
January -0.029** -0.037** -0.007 -0.041** -0.011* -0.004 
 [0.003] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009] 
February -0.041** -0.034** 0.007 -0.035** 0.006 -0.001 
 [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.009] 
March -0.045** -0.042** 0.003 -0.046** -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] 
April -0.054** -0.046** 0.007 -0.059** -0.005 -0.012 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] 
May -0.055** -0.056** -0.002 -0.059** -0.004 -0.002 
 [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] 
June -0.065** -0.067** -0.002 -0.062** 0.003 0.006 
 [0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] 
July -0.068** -0.066** 0.003 -0.074** -0.006 -0.009 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] 
August -0.078** -0.081** -0.003 -0.080** -0.003 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] 
Notes:  
All models include cohort dummies, admissions policy dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, 
whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language), a series of 
neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details) and school fixed effects.  
**
 
indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the local authority level. 
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Table 7.1 Month of birth penalties: mean differences in key education 
outcomes at ages 11, 14, 16, 18 and 19/20  
 Standardised average point 
scores 
Proportion reaching  
expected level 
College 
participation 
 Age 11 Age 14 Age 16 Age 16 Age 18 Age 19/20 
September 0.185 0.123 0.077 0.567 0.377 0.334 
October -0.026** -0.016** -0.009** -0.004* -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
November -0.059** -0.036** -0.023** -0.012** -0.005 -0.005** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
December -0.095** -0.058** -0.037** -0.018** -0.009** -0.007** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
January -0.138** -0.087** -0.055** -0.028** -0.013** -0.009** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
February -0.162** -0.101** -0.059** -0.028** -0.012** -0.008** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
March -0.190** -0.118** -0.067** -0.030** -0.010** -0.008** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
April -0.224** -0.138** -0.078** -0.034** -0.014** -0.008** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
May -0.257** -0.153** -0.082** -0.039** -0.013** -0.008** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
June -0.289** -0.176** -0.102** -0.047** -0.016** -0.013** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
July -0.323** -0.195** -0.110** -0.052** -0.022** -0.015** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
August -0.351** -0.214** -0.126** -0.058** -0.023** -0.015** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Notes:  
All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for 
free school meals and whether English is their first language), a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 
3.2 for details) and school fixed effects.  
**
 
indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the local authority level. 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1 Proportion of students reaching governments‟ expected level at 
ages 7, 11 and 14: Cohort 1 
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Figure 4.2 Proportion of students reaching governments‟ expected level at 
ages 11, 14, 16 and 18, plus college participation: Cohort 2 
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Appendix A 
Figure A.1  Graph showing when children who are expected to start school in 
September actually start school 
 
Notes:  
This graph shows, for all children who started school in a community school in England between 2001-02 and 2006-
07 in a local authority in which they were expected to start in September, when they actually started school. 
Figure A.2 Graph showing when children who are expected to start school in 
January actually start school 
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This graph shows, for all children who started school in a community school in England between 2001-02 and 2006-
07 in a local authority in which they were expected to start in January, when they actually started school. 
Figure A.3. Graph showing when children who are expected to start school in 
April actually start school 
 
Notes:  
This graph shows, for all children who started school in a community school in England between 2001-02 and 2006-
07 in a local authority in which they were expected to start in April, when they actually started school. 
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Appendix B 
Figure B.1 Standardised average point scores at ages 7, 11 and 14, by 
month of birth 
 
Figure B.2 Proportions of students reaching the governments‟ expected level 
at ages 7, 11 and 14, by month of birth 
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Appendix C 
Figure C.1 Standardised average point scores at ages 11, 14 and 16, by 
month of birth 
 
Figure C.2 Proportions reaching expected level at ages 16 and 18, and 
proportion starting college at age 19/20, by month of birth 
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